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ABSTRACT
We study the effects of tax laws on foreign direct investment (FDI)
and direct investment abroad (DIA), distinguishing in each case between
investment financed by retained earnings and investment financed by
transfers from abroad. We find that tax policy, through its effect on
the rate-of-return available in the U.S., has an important effect on the
international location of investment. FDI in the U.S. is very sensitive
to after-tax rates-of-return available here. U.S. direct investment
abroad is also affected, although to a lesser extent.
We use these estimates to examine the effects of the 1981-82 tax
changes on the international location of investment. We estimate that
the tax changes lowered annual DIA by $0.5 billion to $1.0 billion (2%
to 4% of its 1980 value), and raised annual FDI by $2 billion to $4
billion (11% of 20% of its 1980 value). We also discuss the welfare
effects of tax policy toward international investment.
Our results suggest that the tax effects on the international
location of investment are important. Tax policies, such as ACRS and
the ITC, which raise the after tax rate-of-return on new investment
without losing revenue from previous investment, not only stimulate
domestic fixed investment, but also attract additional investment from
abroad. The additional investment supplements the domestic investment
impact on productivity and raises corporate tax revenue. However, our
results should be taken as preliminary estimates, not as definitive
statements about the long-run impacts of tax policy.
Michael J. Boskin William C. Gale
NBER Stanford University
204 Junipero Serra Blvd. Stanford, CA 94305
Stanford, CA 943051. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States and U.S.
direct investment abroad (DIA) are important economic phenomena as well
as a source of political controversy. In 1980, FDI reached $17 billion,
about 22% as large as net domestic fixed investment. Correspondingly,
DIA reached $19 billion, about 25% as large as net domestic investment
in plant and equipment. Since 1980, substantial FDI has continued,
whereas DIA has fallen precipitously. Further, the sources of finance
for FDI and the uses of earnings on DIA have changed dramatically in the
past few years.
These flows --inboth directions -- havebecome a concern of tax
policy. For example, the adoption of the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS) in 1981, as amended in 1982, was expressly limited to
investment in the United States. While the primary motivation behind
ACRS was to increase U.S. domestic capital formation, a secondary
concern, evidenced in the hearings preceding its adoption, was to stem
the flow of U.S. investment abroad. Further, FDI is often seen as an
important justification for continuing the U.S. corporate income tax,
even by those who favor corporate and personal tax integration. Another
example of revenue (and perhaps location of investment) concern is the
per country limitation to the foreign tax credit in the Administration's
tax reform proposal.
Multinational firms undoubtedly invest outside their home country
for a wide variety of reasons: access to markets, political
considerations, labor costs, proximity to suppliers, and expected economic
conditions, to name a few. Often, the reasons may be industry, firm, or
even product-specific. Given these other forces shaping the
international location of investment, however, tax laws potentially
1affect the attractiveness of U.S. direct investmentabroad, and foreign
direct investment in the U.S., as well as therepatriation of earnings
and/or capital. The major changes in U.S. domestic investment
incentives enacted in 1981 and 1982 (ERTA and TEFRA,respectively)
combined with the trends in FDI and DIA, as wellas current tax reform
proposals which might affect tax rates on DIA and FDIsubstantially,
lead us to reexamine the question of the extent to whichtax policy
appears to influence the international location of investment.
We begin in Section 2 with a brief literaturereview, focusing on
the differing effects on the location of investment oftax policy toward
domestic investment and toward foreign source income. Theargument in
Hartman (1981, 1984, 1985) --thatforeign investment financed by
retained earnings should not be influenced by the(deferred) home
country tax on foreign source income -- ispresented and some caveats
suggested.
Section 3 presents a description of recent trends inFDI and DIA,
their sources of finance and theiruses, as well as their industrial
composition and origin or location, respectively. It alsodescribes the
data used in our study.
Section 4 presents our empirical results.First, for the period
1965-79, we compare our results using revised data to those ofHartman.
The results are fairly robust to the data revisions.Next, for both FDI
and DIA we use revised data on extended sampleperiods and several
alternative functional forms and combinations of variablesto test the
impact of tax policy on FDI and DIA. We conclude that taxpolicy can
have significant effects on the international location ofinvestment.
Our results are similar to the quantitative estimates inHartman's
2several studies f:)r so; of the effects, but they are only about one-
third to onehalf as large for others, e.g., the impact of U.S. domestic
tax policy on U.S. direct investment abroad.
Section 5 presents a brief summary and conclusion, including rough
estimates of the likely impacts of recent tax policy and current
proposals on the international location of investment, and an analysis
of the welfare effects of taxation of FDI and DIA.
2.A Brief Review of the Literature
The effects of domestic tax policy on the international location of
investment occur primarily through two channels: home country tax
policy towards investment in the home country, and home country tax
policy towards foreign source income.1
Domestic tax policy towards investments made in the home country
affect both FDI in the home country and DIA by home country firms. This
occurs because tax policy alters the relative rates-of-return available
at home and abroad. Entrepreneurs investing capital will naturally be
attracted to locations where the (risk-adjusted) rate-of-return is
highest.2 Of course, this channel hinges on thesubstitutability
of foreign and domestic investment for a firm. However, the common
conception of foreign and domestic investment as alternative methods of
producing the same good and/or serving the same (geographic) market
suggests that there is some substitution between locations of
1. The home country is where the parent company is based.
2. Issues concerning risk adjustment are not addressed in this paper.
3investment. Moreover, as discussed in Hartman (1981), if there are
financial constraints on firms, there will be a clear tradeoff between
foreign and domestic opertions. Thus, there are good theoretical reasons
for domestic tax policy to affect both FDI and DIA through its effects
on relative rates-of-return. Empirically, this view has been supported
by results in Hartman (1981, 1984) and below.
The importance of taxes on foreign source income has long been a
subject of debate. There are two major approaches to taxation of
foreign source income. In the "territorial" approach, the company pays
no home country taxes on foreign income. In the "residence" approach,
the company does pay home country taxes, but often a credit or deduction
is allowed for taxes paid in the host country. The United States taxes
with the residence approach, but allows a credit for taxes paid to other
countries.
Research in the 1960s and 1970s focused largely on the issue of
"capital export neutrality," the equivalent tax treatment of the foreign
and domestic returns of multinational companies. In this regard, it was
argued that, under a residential system with a credit for foreign taxes,
the ability to defer taxation on foreign source income conferred a tax
advantage toward investment abroad.3
This view has been challenged by Hartman (1981, 1984, 1985).
Hartman properly draws attention to the distinction between investment
3. See Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978) or Caves (1982) for a review of
this position.
4financed out of retained earnings abroad and investment financedby
transfers from home. If the subsidiary is investing out of retained
earnings, the home country tax on foreign source income does not affect
the marginal investment decision, because the repatriation ofearnings,
not the earnings themselves, are the tax base. The homecountry tax on
foreign source income is unavoidable, and its present value does not
depend on the length of deferral. Thus, the marginal investment
decision for investment out of retained earnings should dependonly on
net returns available in the home country or the host country. Hartman
calls this "capital import neutrality", i.e., the same tax rates
influence the decisions of both U.S. firms in the U.S. andforeign firms
in the U.S. that finance investment by retained earnings.4
For firms that finance foreign investment by transfers from home,
the home country tax on foreign source income does matter becauseno
foreign earnings have accrued and thus the tax on foreign source income
is avoidable. One implication of this theory is that a foreign
affiliate should never simultaneously repatriate earnings and draw funds
from home, since this creates a completely avoidable taxliability.
Hartman defines firms that finance foreign investment by retention of
earnings as "mature" firms, those that finance investment by transfers
4. However, even when the tax on foreign source income is not aconcern, it
is not the case that foreign firms in the U.S. respond to the same tax
rates as do U.S. firms. Foreign firms care about the tax rate paid at
the corporate level. U.S. firms should respond to the total effective
tax rate. These rates are developed in Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and
Poterba (1983) and Feldstein and Jun (1986). They do not always move in
tandem. Moreover, it would be easy to design policies that affect the
rates differently, e.g., the current tax reform bill HR3838.
5from home as "immature". He argues that a large part of U.S. DIA is
undertaken by mature firms, since approximately 70% of DIA in 1975-79
was financed by retained earnings. Thus, he concludes, "the size of the
U.S. tax burden on foreign source income should be irrelevant for
investment decisions." (1985, p. 119)
Several caveats apply to this conclusion. First, it should be
noted that neither we nor Hartman test this proposition. Second, in
recent years DIA financed by retained earnings has risen while DIA has
fallen, suggesting a re-examination of the issues. Third, domestic
treatment of foreign source income will not matter for timing of
repatriation only if the domestic tax rate is known and thought to be
permanent. If major tax policy revisions occur frequently (as has in




Foreign direct investment refers to the infusion of funds into a
U.S. subsidiary by the foreign parent or the retention of earnings by
that subsidiary. The Bureau of Economic Analysis defines a U.S.
affiliate as "a U.S. business enterprise in which a foreign person owns
or controls, directly or indirectly, at least 10% of the voting
securities if an incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent
interest if an unincorporated business enterprise."5 U.S. directinvestment abroad is defined equivalently for the foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. parent companies.6
Two aspects of this definition merit comment. First, foreign
direct investment and direct investment abroad are not necessarily the
dominant aspects of international capital flows. As of end-of-year
1984, foreign direct investment in the U.S. accounted for approximately
18% of all foreign assets in the United States, while U.S. direct
investment abroad represented 25% of U.S. assets abroad (Scholl (1985)).
Second, foreign direct investment is not the exact counterpart to
domestic net investment figures. For example, inflows of funds (or
retention of earnings) are not necessarily used to purchase real capital
assets, so FDI may overstate real foreign net investment. On the other
hand, U.S. borrowing by the U.S. subsidiary is not part of the
calculation of FDI. Hartman (1984) suggests that it is reasonable to
use FDI figures as net foreign investment. Hartman (1981) shows that an
equivalent proposition also holds for U.S. direct investment abroad.
B. Trends
Summary data for foreign direct investment in the U.S. and U.S.
direct investment abroad are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
As shown in Table 1, foreign direct investment hasgrown 2000% in
real terms from 1950 to 1984. Large swings characterize the last third
5. Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 1980,p. 1. A person is
defined to include any individual, associated group, estate, trust,
corporation or any government.
6. U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 1977, p. 2.
7of this period, with tremendous growth from 1977 to 1981, a collapse of
50% in 1982 and 1983, and a doubling in 1984. FDI figures are also
large in relative terms. In every year since 1980, FDI has been more
than 20% of U.S. nonresidential net investment in plant and equipment.
This is especially noteworthy for 1984, because net investment in the
U.S. rose by over 100% of its 1983 level. The composition of the
sources of FDI has changed over time. Since 1977, the percentage of FDI
financed by retained earnings has fallen substantially. This has
occurred contemporaneously with the large rise in FDI documented in
column 1, thus suggesting that investment financed by intercompany debt
and equity flows has dominated FDI in recent years. Finally, column 4
shows that the reinvestment ratio for FDI income has also fallen since
1982, though it was relatively stable in earlier periods.
U.S. direct investment abroad, shown in Table 2, grew steadily
through 1979, but has since collapsed, representing a large and
continuing repatriation of funds to the U.S.Real DIA in 1984 is only
2% higher than it was in 1950. These notions are reinforced by
examination of DIA as a percentage of U.S. nonresidential net
investment. DIA was consistently 20% or more of net investment in the
l960s and l970s but has collapsed to 11% or less since 1981. The
composition of DIA finance, shown in column 3, has undergone extreme
gyrations in recent years. Nevertheless, the reinvestment ratio for DIA
income has remained relatively stable.
Table 3 provides a snapshot of the level and composition of the
U.S. positions in FDI and DIA as of the end of 1984. Both FDI and DIA
have accummulated substantial positions. Approximately one-third of the
FDI position is in manufacturing and one-sixth in petroleum. These twoindustries also account for 40% and 25% of the DIA position,
respectively. Not surprisingly, European countries account for the
largest share of both positions. Although Japan accounts for only 9.3%
of the FDI position, it should be noted that this figure has risen from
2.1% in 1975 and 6.4% in 1979. Moreover, as noted above, capital
inflows may occur predominantly in forms other than FDI.
Thus, even a cursory examination of the data suggests that both FDI
and DIA can be substantial. The wide swings suggest further that
international investment flows may be very sensitive to current or
anticipated conditions. Before proceeding to a more formal analysis,
however, issues concerning the data should be noted.
C. Sources
All data in FDI and DIA have been obtained from either Selected
Data on Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., 1950-79; Selected Data
on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 1950-76; or the annual surveys of
these topics in the Survey of Current Business, all of which are
publications of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
BEA develops these series by conducting occasional "benchmark"
surveys of virtually all firms involved in FDI or DIA. They construct
between year data by conducting annual sample surveys and extrapolating
the total figures based on the firms in the sample surveys and the
previous benchmark survey. Thus, as the time since the latest benchmark
survey increases, the chance of mis-estimation would seem to increase.
BEA conducted DIA benchmark surveys in 1966, 1977, and 1982. FDI
surveys were undertaken in 1974 and 1980.
The 1980 FDI survey in particular generated substantial revisions
in data for 1980 and later dates. For example, the direct investment
position in FDI was revised upward by 21%, capital inflows (i.e.
9foreign direct investment) were revised upward by 24%, and FDI income
was revised downward by 9% (Belli, 1984). With these revised data for
1980, the direct investment position rose 52% from its 1979 value, and
FDI was 42% higher than in 1979. Note that BEA did not revise the data
from the 1970s based on the 1980 benchmark survey.
There is reason to believe that a substantial part of the abrupt
junips in these series is due to underreporting during the 1970s.
Specifically, BEA estimates that about 75% of the revision in the
capital inflows figure was accounted for by affiliates that should have
reported in the annual sample surveys but did not.7
One additional concern is that through 1979 BEA collected retained
earnings for incorporated affiliates only. In 1980, unincorporated
affiliates began to report retained earnings too. Thus, the series
"investment financed by retained earnings" re below) refers to
incorporated affiliates only through 1979, and all affiliates in 1980
and thereafter. BEA presented separate data for incorporated and
unincorporated affiliates for 1980-83, but has since discontinued the
practice.
To account for the problems with the data discussed above, we have
7. Belli, p. 34. BEA estimates that all of the revision in capital inflows
was due to underreporting, but 25% of the underreporting was by exempt
affiliates. For the direct investment position, two-thirds of the upward
revision was due to underreporting, one-third due to revision or
correction in the sample data. BEA does not state what part of the
underreporting of direct investment position should have been reported,
but if (as for capital inflows) 75% of the underreporting should have
been reported, then one-half (2/3 x 3/4) of the upward revision in
direct investment position should have been reported in the sample
survey. This suggests that the position in FDI was also substantially
underreported in the l970s.
10conducted a variety 0±.alternativespecifications. The alternatives are
discussed with other regression results in Section 4.
All tax rate and rate-of-return data have been generously supplied
by Martin Feldstein and Joosung Jun (1986). Data on U.S. gross national
product, actual and middle cycle expansion path, have been taken from
the Economic Report of the President, 1985 and de Leeuw and Holloway
(1983). Data concerning gross domestic product in OECD countries were
obtained from National Accounts of OECD Countries, 1950-68 and 1950-78,
and OECD Main Economic Indicators in recent years.
4. Results
Table 4A presents FDI equations for 1965-79 estimated by us and
Hartman (1984). The data that Hartman used were presented in an
Appendix to that article. Our results use a revised tax rate and rate-
of-return series presented in Feldstein and Jun (1986). Our results
with the original data are very close to Hartman's. With the revised
data, our estimates of the effects of taxes and rates-of-return are
still similar to Hartman's especially for the retained earnings
equations. For the equations examining I, our estimates show a
decline in the elasticities with respect to foreigners' net return in
the U.S., to 0.9 from 1.2 in the I/Y equation, and to 0.8 from 1.0 in
the retention ratio equation. We also find a lower elasticity for the
relative tax term.8 None of the point estimates changes by more
8. The relative tax term is meant to capture differences between domestic
saving incentives and investment incentives. Thus, a savings incentive
that lowered t' but not t would then increase savings, lower the pre-tax
rate of return and thus lead to a fall in FDI.
11than one standard deviation. We are thus heartened by the stability of
the major qualitative conclusions and quantitative results for the I
equations. The results hold up well with either the original or revised
data. The equations seem to be slightly more sensitive to the data
revisions. The t-statistics and relative magnitudes of the coefficients
do remain stable, though.
In Table 4B, we present basic results for DIA in the 1965-79
period. Here, the data revisions have no effect on the sensitivity of
DIA to its ownrate-of-return.The effect is quite strong (the
elasticity calculated at mean values is approximately 1.4) and
statistically significant. Our estimates of the response of DIA to the
net return in the U.S., however, are approximately one-third the size of
Hartman's.(We estimate an elasticity of 0.2, compared to Hartman's
0.66). Our estimates, like Hartman's, found that the after-tax return
is the relevant measure; the coefficients on gross return are equal and
opposite in sign to the coefficients on gross return times the total
effective tax rate. As with the net return, Hartman's coefficients are
three times as large as ours. These basic equations appear to fit the
data well. Nevertheless, the data revisions seem to have an important
effect on the sensitivity of DIA to variations in the net-of-tax return
in the U.S.
In summary, except for the I/Y equation for FDI and the elasticity
of DIA with repect to net return in the U.S., we obtain results very
similar to Hartman (1981, 1984), even with revised tax rate and rate-of-
return data.
A. New Results for Foreign Direct Investment
Tables 5A and 5B present new results for FDI. In these equations
12we extend the sample forward to 1984, and in some cases backward to 1956,
use the revised series mentioned above, and experiment with a variety of
alternative explanatory variables and functional forms. Estimates can
vary substantially depending on the assumptions made.
Table 5A presents regressions explaining the log of various foreign
direct investment rates. The second equation shows typical results for
the addition of alternative explanatory variables. In short, the basic
rate-of-return and tax variables seem to contain most of the explanatory
power.
For 1965-84, the elasticity of (I/Y) is estimated to be 1.0 with
respect to its own rate of return, 1.9 with respect to the average
foreigners' net return in the U.S., and -2.9 with respect to the
relative tax term. Compared to results for 1965-79, the estimates in
column 2 show a smaller response to return on FDI, and a much larger
response to foreigners net return in the U.S. and relative taxes.
Results are presented for the 1956-84 period, too, in order to
demonstrate the sensitivity to sample period. These results imply
smaller elasticities than the results for 1965-79 or 1965-84.
The retention ratio is modelled in columns 3 and 4. We found
elasticities for 1956-84 and 1965-84 that bracket the 1965-79 estimates
for foreigners' net return in the U.S. and relative tax rates. In each
case the elasticity for 1965-84 is largest. The estimates show a
considerable degree of variation. For the return on FDI, the 1965-79
estimates show the largest elasticity.
The equations modelling investment financed by transfers fit
poorly, as was the case in the 1965-79 sample period. Various
modifications, including the addition of output variables, dummies for
various periods and alternative functional forms do not alter this result.
13Turning to other functional forms, Table 5B presents results for
linear equations in the rate and level of the variables used in Table
5A. In general, these equations do not perform as well as the
logarithmic equations. The coefficients have the correct signs and take
on reasonable values. Using mean values over the sample period, the
elasticity of :[r/Y with respect to the return on FDI is 2.0, with
respect to foreigners' net return in the U.S. is 0.8, and with respect
to the relative tax term is -2.0. Correspondingly, for the retention
ratio, the elasticities for the 1965-84 period are 1.0, 2.3, -4.2,
respectively. Columns 2 and 3 show that, again, regressions extending
backward to 1956 do not perform as well. These coefficients imply
elasticities ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 for foreigners' net return in the
U.S. ,0.6to 0.7 for return on FDI, and -1.4 to -2.9 for relative taxes.
We also employed several alternative specifications including a
dummy variable to capture the negative re in 1982, instrumental
variables to account for potential endogeneity of the return on FDI,
expanding the values of FDI (by 20%) in the late 1970's to proxy for the
underreporting discussed in section 3, and alternative output terms.
The overriding result of these alternative specifications is, as the
Tables above would suggest, that the estimates are fairly sensitive to
the specifications made.
B. New Results for Direct Investment Abroad
Table 6 presents some basic extensions of the DIA results given in
Table 4B. The results are presented only for I*/Y as the other two
equations fit poorly over the entire period. The I*r equations, in
rates and level, tend to confirm strongly our earlier estimates, from
Table 4B. In particular, the net return in the U.S. enters with an
14elasticity of approxinateiy -0.2 in each specification, while the net
return abroad has an elasticity estimated at 1.2 to 1.3. Alternative
specifications led to varying results, and are not reported here.
In summary, our empirical research supports the notion that
domestic tax policy can have a significant impact on DIA and FDI. Our
results are similar to Hartman's for 1965-79, although our elasticity
estimates are somewhat smaller for the response of DIA to a change in
net returns in the U.S. and for the response of FDI to changes in the
return on FDI.
5. Summary and Implications
We have presented above new evidence that U.S. domestic taxpolicy
affects the international location of investment. While the resultsare
somewhat sensitive to sample period, functional form and other
considerations, the qualitative conclusions tend to hold up well. Of
particular interest are two empirical issues -thelikely impact of the
1981-82 corporate tax changes on FDI and DIA and thecorresponding
potential effects of any corporate tax reform. Also important are the
welfare aspects of international location of investment.
Our estimates of the impact on DIA of changes in the after-tax
rate-of-return in the U.S. suggest that a reduction of approximately
four cents of DIA occurs for every dollar of increased U.S. domestic
investment. This estimate derives from a comparison of analogous
coefficients on domestic investment equations estimated by Feldstein and
Jun (1986) This refers only to investment out of retained
9. This estimate is obtained as follows. Feldstein and Jun (1986)regress
net investment divided by GNP on several variables, including the
(lagged) overall net rate-of-return. Their coefficient on the rate-of-
15earnings. It is likely that transfers from domestic parent companies to
foreign subsidiaries, or the establishment of such subsidiaries, is also
responsive to domestic tax policy, but the data are insufficient to
reach any specific conclusions on the matter.
We estimate that a tax policy which raises the after-tax rate of
return enough to lead to a dollar of increased domestic investment in
the U.S. brings with it between eight and twenty-seven cents of
FDI)° These results are consistent with those found in Hartman
(1981, 1984).
Several studies have attempted to study the effect of the 1981-82
investment incentives on effective marginal tax rates (e.g.
,see
Auerbach (1983), Feldstein and Jun (1986), Gravelle (1983), and Hulten
and Robertson (1983).These studies generally find that the effective
corporate tax rate was reduced by about 20% to 35%11
With a
constant before-tax rate-of-return and a pre-ERTA effective tax rate of
about 33%, the tax changes increased foreigners' average net return in
the U.S. by 10% to 17%. Other things equal, our estimates suggest that
return variable is .459. When our equations are transformed into the
appropriate units (i.e., when coefficients are divided by 1000; see note
in Table 6), our estimate of the effect of net rate-of-return in the
U.S. on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad is -.016,which is about 4% as
large (in absolute value) as .459.
10. This is obtained by multiplying the elasticity of 're" with respect to
Foreigners' net return in the U.S. (shown in columns 1 and 2, Table 5A)
by the average value of foreigners' net return in the U.S. (.054) and
dividing by the average of the (transformed) 'r (.00355).
11. Studies differ in their estimates because of differing assumptions about
expected inflation, discount rates, debt/equity ratios, and hurdle
rates, among other things.
16this change in net return would bring about approximately a 2% to 4%
decline in DIA and an 11% to 20% rise in FDI. This would implycapital
inflows of about $0.5 billion to $1.0 billion from smaller DIA and $2
billion to $4 billion in increased FDI. Of course, these figures refer
to FDI and DIA out of retained earnings only. Likewise, a tax reform
such as H.R.3838, which raises (except perhaps atvery high inflation
rates) the effective tax rate on U.S. corporate investment, would result
in an increase in direct investment abroad by U.S. firms and a decrease
in foreign direct investment in the U.S. However, because these results
contain no long term dynamic theory of the optimal international
location of investment, they should not be taken asany final guide to
the impacts of these tax changes on investment patterns.
Finally, the welfare economics of the international location of
investment, described in Caves (1982), Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley
(1983), and Hartman (1984) should be addressed. Domestic economic
welfare rises with FDI because the U.S. receives a claim on the rate-of-
return to foreign capital through the taxation of FDI income.
Conversely, domestic economic welfare falls when U.S. firms substitute
DIA for investment at home,12 because the nation then receives only
the net-of-foreign-tax return (and that only when it is repatriated)
rather than the gross return. These welfare effects are augmented by
the beneficial effects on labor productivity of greater investment -
foreignor domestic -inthe United States. Thus, a reduction in
12. Of course, not all DIA comes at the expense of domestic investment.
17taxation of new corporate investment improves welfare through three
channels: the standard mechanism, through which lowering the effective
marginal tax rate generates new domestic investment opportunities for
U.S. firms; a reallocation of the location of investment by U.S. firms
toward home and away from abroad; and an increase in FDI. In this
paper, we have presented some new evidence that these last two effects
are quantitatively important and therefore that it is necessary to
consider them in any evaluation of domestic investment incentives.
The welfare effects of tax policy clearly depend on the
responsiveness of FDI and DIA to net-of-tax returns. The welfare gains
to a tax reduction confined to new corporate investment are positively
linked to the responsiveness of DIA and negatively linked to the
responsiveness of FDI with respect to net-of-tax returns in the U.S.
Our results suggest that accelerated depreciation or tax credits
for new investment which decrease the effective marginal tax rate paid
at the corporate level by 10% would, through its effect on the net-of-
return available to FDI, raise FDI by 9%. Corporate tax revenues from
taxation of FDI could be expected to rise correspondinly. Similar,
though smaller, revenue effects would occur for DIA. These results
refer to investment financed by retained earnings only. Note, however,
that tax revenue is greater per dollar of potential DIA diverted to
domestic investment than per dollar of FDI, because foreign owners of
U.S. capital pay taxes only at the corporate level, while domestic
owners are also responsible for state, local, and personal taxes.
Our results suggest that the tax effects on the international
location of investment are important. Tax policies, such as ACRS and
ITC, which raise the after tax rate-of-return on new investment without
18losing revenue from previous investment, not only stimulate domestic
fixed investment, but also attract additional investment from abroad.
The additional investment supplements the domestic investment impacton
productivity and raises corporate tax revenue.However, our results
should be taken as preliminary estimates, not as definitive statements
about the long-run impacts of tax policy.
19Table 1
Selected Data on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 1950-1984













1950 $270 2.8% 70.4% 52.9%
1960 315 2.6 55.2 44.2
1970 1,464 4.3 29.6 49.6
1971 367 1.2 147.7 46.6
1972 949 2.5 60.0 44.3
1973 2,800 5.3 32.5 56.6
1974 4,760 9.6 22.4 80.0
1975 2,603 8.5 45.7 53.3
1976 4,346 12.6 38.2 53.3
1977 3,728 7.3 42.5 55.9
1978 7,896 10.7 32.7 61.3
1979 11,876 13.3 33.3 62.2
1980 16,918 21.9 30.6 60.0
1981 25,195 27.8 11.7 43.8
1982 13,792 22.5 -17.2 -75.4
1983 11,946 24.0 0.7 1.6
1984 22,514 21.0 16.5 36.5
Source: Foreign Direct Investment and its components: Selected Data on
Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., 1950-79, and various issues of
Survey of Current Business. Non-residential Net Investment: Economic Report
of the President, 1985, Table B-15, p.250. Values of GNP deflator are
1950:53.56, 1960:68.70, 1970:91.45, 1980:178.42, 1984:223.38.
Notes:
a. Foreign Direct Investment is financed either by retention of earnings or
by intercompany flows of equity or debt.Retained earnings are negative
when dividend payments to equity holders are larger than earnings.
Intercompany flows are net figures and are negative when more funds flow
out of the U.S. subsidary than into it.Thus, the ratio listed above may
be greater than 100% or less than 0.In 1982, retained earnings were
negative.
b. This ratio measures FDI financed by retained earnings divided by FDI
income. It can be negative for the reasons stated in note a.Table 2
Selected Data on Direct Investment Abroad by U.S. Firms, 1950-1984












1950 $1,096 11.4% 43.3% 26.8%
1960 2,941 23.9 43.0 35.0
1970 7,589 22.3 41.8 38.9
1971 7,617 24.4 41.7 34.7
1972 7,746 20.9 58.5 41.4
1973 11,353 21.8 71.8 49.3
1974 9,052 18.4 85.9 40.6
1975 14,244 47.0 56.5 48.5
1976 11,949 34.8 64.4 40.5
1977 11,893 23.5 53.8 32.5
1978 16,056 21.8 70.6 44.6
1979 25,222 28.4 75.2 49.7
1980 19,222 24.9 88.5 45.8
1981 9,624 10.6 140.1 41.6
1982 -4,424 -7.2 -151.6 29.7
1983 5,394 10.8 178.0 45.1
1984 4,503 4.2 243.5 47.5
Source: Direct Investment Abroad and its components: Selected Data on
U.S. Direct Investment Abroad 1950-76, and various issues of Survey of
Current Business.
Notes:
a. See note a, Table 1. In 1982, DIA financed by retained earnings was
positive, but DIA financed by transfers was negative and larger in
absolute value.
b. See note b, Table 1.Table 3

















Source: Survey of Current Business, August, 1985,pp. 30,36,47.Table 4A
Comparison of Basic Results for Foreign Direct Investment, 1965-79
Dependent Variableln(I)a1(1/)a_ln(I /bjln(I /b) ln(It)cln(It/Y)c


























































.096 .117 .071 .070 .590 .244
Adjusted R2 .940 .931 .750 .753 .286 .205
Durbin-Watson 1.67 1.54 2.26 2.32 1.92 1.87
Source: All data are provided in I-Iartman (1984). A revised series for tax rates and rates-
of-return have been supplied by Martin Feldstein and Joosung Jun (1986).
Notes:
a. Iis Foreign Direct Investment financed by retained earnings.This series is multiplied
by l06 and divided by GNP to obtain
b. E represents income from Foreign Direct Investment. Income =earnings+ interest(net of
witholding taxes) -withholdingtaxes on distributed earnings.
c. It refers to investment financed by transfers of funds into the country. This series is
also multiplied by 1000 and divided by CNP. Moreover, since It is negative in 1971, Hartman
adds 1.676 billion to It before transforming. To allow comparability, we add this constant
too.
d. Our results use the updated series provided by Feldstein and Jun. Our estimates using
the data presented in Hartman (1984) are very close to our results in this table.
e. Return on FDI is calculated as income from Foreign Direct Investment divided by end-of-
year Direct Investment Position (in FDI) for the previous year.
f. Foreigners' return in the U.S. is defined as the overall gross-rate of return times one
minus the tax rate paid at the corporate level.
g. The relative tax term =(l-t')/(l-t),where t' =thetotal effective tax rate, t =tax
rate paid at the corporate level.Table 4B
for Direct Investment Abroad,
Source: Hartman (1981).
Notes:
a. Defined as Direct Investment Abroad financed by retained earnings divided by
U.S. GNP.
b. Defined as overall gross rate of return times one minus the total effective
tax rate.
c. Defined as income from Direct Investment Abroad divided by the end-of-year
Direct Investment Position (in DIA) for the previous year.






























































.000405 .000399 .000424 .000418
Adusted R2 .937 .941 .931 .954
Durbin-Watson 2.15 1.82 2.15 1.82Table 5A
New Results for Foreign Direct Investment
Dependent Variableln(I/Y)ln(I/Y)ajln(I /E)aln(I/E) ln(I/Y)b





constant 4.894 11.848 2.644 3.968 .533
(1.082) (3.764) (1.535) (1.330) (1.175)
ln(return on FDI) .978 1.039 .193 .228 .041
(.130) (.185) (.133) (.135) (.179)
ln(Foreigners' .400 1.906 .475 1.121 -.214
netreturnin U.S.) (.323) (.643) (.331) (.415) (.435)
ln(relative -.979 -2.895 -1.107 -1.633 -.537
tax term) (.353) (1.265) (.361) (.411) (.486)
Dummy for 1980's - .242 - -
- (.237)
- -
AdjustedU.S. GNPC - -2.713 -
- (2.806) -
AdjustedOECD GDPd - - .903 -
(.879)
Dummy for 1974 -. 509 - -
(.629)
Standard Error .202 .192 .209 .205 .262
of Regression
Adjusted R2 .727 .831 .345 .542 .218
Durbin-Watson 2.26 2.36 1.98 1.90 2.00
Sources: Middle Expansion Trend GNP: de Leeuw and Holloway (1983), and
subsequent issues of Survey of Current Business. OECD data: National Accounts
of OECD Countries, 1950-68 and 1950-79, and OECD Main Economic Indicators in
subsequent years.
Notes:
a. Because Iis negative in 1982, a constant was added to (Ix l000)/CNP
before takinlogarithms. The constant =3,880,chosen such tttheminimum
(transformed) observation was roughly equivalent to the minimum (transformed)
observation for I•
b. This variable is as defined on Table 4A.
c. Measured as U.S. GNP divided by middle expansion trend U.S. CNP.
d. Measured (GDP of all OECD countries -U.S.GDP), divided by its linear trend value.Notes:









































































































Adjusted R2 .900 .938
Durbin-Watson 1.62 1.76
Notes:
a. (I*re/Y) is DIA financed by retained earnings x 1000 divided by
GNP.
b. See Table 43 for definition.References
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